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ARTICLES
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION: WHAT
SHOULD WE EXPECT OF FEDERAL AGENCIES?
Robert L. Fischman'
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years after the landmark 1973 endangered species legislation,
the public still does not have a clear sense of what it can expect from federal
agencies. To be sure, certain duties are clearly prescribed. The citizen suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has helped establish some
minimum standards, especially for section 7 interagency consultation and
for section 9 takings prohibition. Nonetheless, the affirmative duty to
conserve species and the role federal agencies will play in monitoring,
listing, or recovering species remains vague. Conventional legal touch-
stones, such as case law, regulations, and statutes, provide little direction
for implementing these broad strategies pivotal for long-term preservation.
The ESA details how it will prevent the worst harms but is sketchy on how
it will promote its conservation goals.'
This article discusses the institutional behavior of federal agencies to
better understand how they regard endangered species conservation. By
looking at what agencies stand to gain or lose from strengthening
endangered species programs, we can both hone our expectations for
agency action and suggest ways to improve endangered species manage-
ment.' Existing management tools hold promise to leverage administrative
I
1. Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. I wish to thank Pam
Eaton, Bob Keiter, and my colleagues from the faculty of the first three Environmental Law Institute-
U.S. Forest Service threatened, endangered, and sensitive species management courses for sharing
their ideas. An Indiana University School of Law Summer Faculty Fellowship provided support for this
article.
2. The purpose of the ESA is to conserve both species and ecosystems. 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b)
(1988). The ESA defines "conservation" as the use of all methods and procedures necessary to recover
species from threatened or endangered status. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1988).
3. See generally RICHARD TOBIN, THE EXPENDABLE FUTURE: U.S. POLITICS AND THE
PROTECTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (1990); STEVEN YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENT-
ING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982) (taking this approach to explain the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife implementation of the ESA).
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incentives and raise the chances for species survival.
This article does not focus on the agencies that are primarily
responsible for administering the federal endangered species program: the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS). Rather, this article focuses on the other agencies that
must incorporate endangered species protection into missions that tradi-
tionally do not embrace such concern or that sometimes conflict with the
goals of the ESA. Agencies must overcome a natural disinclination to take
the important affirmative steps to meet the lofty goals of the Act. My
purpose is to describe mechanisms through which regulatory and resource
management agencies can advance endangered species protection.
The FWS receives less than $10 million annually to recover
threatened and endangered species. This compares discouragingly with the
estimated price tag of $4600 million to achieve the recovery goal.' A
disparity of that magnitude cries out for better approaches in addition to
better funding. This article offers indirect ways to secure more of the
needed resources.
Conservation of endangered species shares a vital characteristic with
nature protection goals generally; interagency coordination is essential. If
the FWS could recover species by acting alone, using solely its own
authority, then implementing the goals of the ESA would be relatively
easy Alas, natural systems do not respect geographical boundaries, let
alone more abstract divisions in administrative jurisdiction. Therefore, the
tools discussed in this article that can create channels of cooperation
between agencies should also suggest approaches to address larger conser-
vation concerns such as protecting biological diversity and preventing
pollution.5
II. THE ESA AND AGENCY BEHAVIOR: THE MOTIVATORS
Before discussing mechanisms to improve federal agency manage-
ment of endangered species, we must first explore what motivates agency
actions. Unfortunately, the simple statutory command of Congress to
conserve endangered species and the ecosystems on which they depend6 is
not enough to engender agency commitment. Even worse, the mere
recognition that conservation requires coordination, though important, is
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP No. 90-98,
AUDIT REPORT: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM 11 (Sept. 1990).
5. See, e.g., Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem On the Public Domain: Law &
Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REV 923 (1989) (discussing the complex,
interjurisdicitional problems in ecosystem management); Barry G. Rabe & Janet B. Zimmerman,
Cross-Media Environmental Integration in the Great Lakes Basin, 22 ENVTL. L. 253 (1991)
(discussing similar problems in pollution prevention and control).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988).
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insufficient incentive to spur interagency cooperation. This section de-
scribes four important motivating factors that drive administrative behav-
ior. Sometimes these incentives (or disincentives) drive agencies to protect
endangered species. Often, though, they thwart the goals of the ESA. The
challenge for conservationists is to find opportunities in these perverse
incentives to promote preservation.
A. Avoid Lawsuits
Agencies avoid lawsuits because of cost, embarrassment, and risk of
losing control of programs. Even if the direct costs of litigation are borne by
the Department of Justice, lawsuits always require defendant staff to work
with attorneys in preparing the government's case. This frustrates not only
those involved but also the aims of the agency, which are diverted.
Furthermore, litigation challenges the pride that administrators take in
their programs. For land management agencies in particular, which
subscribe to the model of wise stewardship, litigation can shake morale and
public confidence. For a regulatory agency, like the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), litigation can soil a white hat. On a more
prosaic level, suits challenging an action may reflect poorly on the
performance of the particular decision-maker involved. If an agency loses
in court, it may forfeit discretion to conduct its programs as it deems fit.
Injunctive relief can turn judges into administrators.7
The legal literature on the ESA focuses almost exclusively on tools
that can prevent litigation. This makes perfect sense in light of the specific
statutory duties imposed on agencies and enforceable through the citizen
suit provision.8 In fact, compared with other resource management or
environmental laws, the ESA imposes quite stringent substantive, enforce-
able requirements on agencies.9 However, as we shall see, an agency's
aversion to lawsuits can be used to motivate the agency to go beyond the
specific requirements of the ESA and its regulations.
Federal agencies have four fundamental legal duties that courts
enforce through the citizen suit provision. I characterize them as the "four
c's" 10 The first three are the affirmative commands of section 7" conserve,
consult, and confer. The fourth is the obligation to avoid in section 9" can't
take.
7. See infra part II.B.
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
9. Compare TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,174 (1978) (explaining that an agency's duty under the
ESA to ensure that its actions do not jeopardize endangered species admits of no exception) with
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835,1846 (1989) (holding that NEPA does
not mandate particular results).
10. For the geographically minded, the four seas (oceans) serve as a reminder of the basic
principles of the ESA. Those more climatically inclined may use the mnemonic four seasons.
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Section 7 of the ESA contains the three affirmative commands." The
conservation obligation is the most vague and the least fleshed-out by the
courts. 2 Although this obligation to utilize agency authorities to recover
(not just prevent jeopardy to)' a species holds great promise to force
agencies to act cooperatively and proactively, it is not yet a powerful
incentive. At the very least, the conservation obligation can be an
independent basis for an agency decision, such as denying water flows to
irrigators from a federal dam so that species requiring a certain instream
flow will be protected.' " At most, it may be a basis for citizen challenge to
agency inaction. (As we shall see, the consultation obligation applies only
to agency actions.)
The duty to consult is the most contentious enforceable obligation. It
requires that agencies consult with the FWS 15 to ensure that actions are
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or to
result in the adverse modification of critical habitat.'" In addition to the
substantive standard of no jeopardy or adverse modification, there is also a
procedural component. 17 Interagency regulations provide the framework
for consultation and some agencies overlay additional procedures and
assessments.' 8 When an action may affect a listed species, agencies
generally must formally consult with the FWS. The result of the consulta-
tion is a FWS biological opinion that states whether the proposed action
will jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify critical habitat. An
agency that proceeds with an action subject to a jeopardy opinion', is likely
to be in violation of the substantive prong of the consultation duty The
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1988). See Thomas France& Jack Tuholski, Stay the Hand: New
Directions for the Endangered Species Act, 7 PUB. LAND L. REv 1 (1986).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1988) (defining conservation to mean the use of all methods and
procedures to recover species so that they no longer need the protection of the ESA). See Defenders of
Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977) (invalidating federal duck hunting regulations
because they did not incorporate all methods to recover listed species). But see Conner v. Andrus, 453
F Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
14. Carson-Truckee Water Conservation Dist. v. Watt, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
15. Depending on the species at issue, the NMFS may be the lead agency. However, of the 615
listed species that occur in the United States, fewer than three percent fall under the purview of the
NMFS. For simplicity, I will continue to refer soley to the FWS even though most statements are
applicable also to the NMFS. As more populations of pacific salmon are listed, NMFS will play a
greater role in administering the ESA.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
17 In contrast, the conservation obligation consists solely of a substantive standard.
18. 50 C.F.R. Part 402 (1991). See, e.g., U.S.D.A. Forest Service Manual Chap. 2670; U.S.
Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management Manual Chapter 6840.
19. "Jeopardy opinion" is the common shorthand for a biological opinion that finds a proposed
action will likely jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or adversely modify critical
habitat.
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ESA citizen suit provision can be used to force formal consultation where
an action may affect a listed species or critical habitat,20 or to prevent
irreversible commitment of resources to a project that would limit the
ability of the FWS to recommend reasonable and prudent alternatives.2
The potential hurdle that formal consultation, possibly leading to a
jeopardy opinion, presents for agencies that wish to carry out their
programs-as-usual provides the incentive to use many of the coordination
tools described below to obviate consultation.
When a species is proposed to be listed, it does not enjoy the
substantive protection offered by the consultation duty However, agencies
conducting activities likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a
proposed species must confer with the FWS for advisory recommenda-
tions.22 This preventive procedural requirement can be used strategically
by agencies to avoid disruptions to programs if and when proposed species
are finally listed.
Unlike the other duties, the prohibitive obligation ("can't take")
applies to all persons, not just federal agencies. Next to the consultation
duty, the taking prohibition is the greatest legal threat to agency action.
The taking prohibition not only stops actions that directly harm or harass
individuals, it also precludes actions that significantly modify or degrade
habitat.23 The U.S. Forest Service's loss of a citizen suit alleging that
timber management violated section 9 by degrading red-cockaded wood-
pecker habitat illustrates the power of litigation and its link to the next
motivator, discretion. 4
The first step for a federal agency seeking to protect species is to fulfill
its four basic duties under the ESA. Many agencies begin and end there.
However, a forward-looking agency that seeks to avoid slipping into a
situation where simple compliance and declining species numbers means a
20. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1991). Major construction activities require an agency to prepare a
biological assessment to determine whether formal consultation is necessary. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)
(1988). See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the USFS violated the
ESA by failing to prepare a biological assessment on a road and connected timber sales).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1988). See North Borough v. Andrus, 486 F Supp. 332 (D.D.C.
i979), aff'd 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing the test for when an agency action constitutes an
illegal commitment of resources).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1988).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (prohibiting takes) and § 1532(19) (defining "take" to mean "harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in such
conduct"); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1991) (defining harm to include "significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering"). See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (clarifying regulatory definition of harm).
24. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), afd in part, vacated in part,
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
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confrontation with unpalatable choices will be motivated to employ some
of the tools discussed in Part III.
B. Enhance Discretion
On June 17, 1986, a public land manager's worst nightmare came true
for the Texas National Forests. U.S. District Court Judge Robert Parker
assumed the role of "forestmaster" and ordered the Forest Service to
implement a detailed timber management plan, in accordance with
parameters he laid out, that would protect the endangered red-cockaded
woodpecker 2 Judge Parker found, and the appeals court later affirmed,
that the Forest Service (USFS) violated both section 7 and section 9 of the
ESA by jeopardizing the continued existence of the woodpecker and
harming the bird through habitat modification. The section 7 violation was
particularly surprising in light of the FWS approval of woodpecker
management guidelines during the course of consultation. Although the
appeals court ultimately found that Judge Parker's remedy went too far in
specifying exactly what the management plan should cont4in, his injunc-
tion stood for three years. Even on remand, Judge Parker retained the
power to disapprove the plan submitted by the USFS, albeit under a more
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. 6
Administrators and public land managers guard their discretion to
stay in control of agency programs. A public land manager relies on a
stewardship tradition that requires a "wise" decision-maker to have
flexibility A rulemaking agency relies on discretion to ease its burden to
justify regulations and their implementation. Both pride and practicality
motivate agencies to maintain and enhance discretion.2 7
The prohibitive character of the ESA runs counter to this motivator;
agencies regard the ESA as a threat to their discretion. Although this
conventional view is generally true, Professor Yaffee notes that a clear,
strict standard may be preferred by agencies that fear uncertainty in what
is required of them.28 Also, an externally imposed decision does not require
as much justification as an internally generated decision that represents
25. Id. I borrow the term "forestmaster" from Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 624
F. Supp. 1045, 1062-63 (D. Nev. 1985), where Judge James Burns "resist [ed] the invitation to become
western Nevada's rangemaster" despite some facts that suggested poor management or insensitivity to
environmental concerns on the part of the BLM.
26. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 439-40 (5th Cir. 1991).
27 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors: A
Study of Federal Interagency Relations, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 259 (1987) (describing the desires of
park and forest managers to "maximize their own judgment, discretion, and inventiveness").
Legislation can be as much a threat as litigation. Agencies often adopt conservation programs to lessen
pressure on Congress to mandate action. Id. at 259-60.
28. S. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY 149 (1982).
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some balance of values. Agencies can use the ESA to justify decisions they
may prefer for other reasons - perhaps for simplicity itself. For instance,
the Army Corps of Engineers normally must engage in a difficult balancing
of public interest and private gain to determine whether to issue a Clean
Water Act Section 404 dredge or fill permit.29 However, this balancing is
unnecessary when the proposed project is likely to jeopardize an endan-
gered species or adversely modify its critical habitat. In that case, the
Army Corps simply denies the permit."0
The red-cockaded woodpecker story should illustrate that even if
agencies do regard the ESA as a hindrance to their closely-guarded
flexibility, violation of the Act may present even more serious hurdles to
accomplishing agency goals. A regulator or resource manager who wants
to retain her discretion may employ some of the tools discussed in the next
section to buffer her vulnerability to an ESA injunction. Instead of merely
avoiding a take, an agency might want to participate actively in species
recovery to allow for a wider margin of error.3
C. Increase Budget
Endangered species protection can cost agencies money, both in
diverted expenditures (such as for mitigation projects), and in foregone
revenues from activities (such as timber sales) that contribute to the
administrative coffers. In today's austere fiscal climate, these ESA costs
often require offsetting sacrifices in other agency programs. Why would a
federal agency voluntarily put resources into species protection programs 9
One reason is that the alternatives may be even more costly The
USFS has observed that the costs of conserving a species, once listed, are
substantially greater than the costs of conserving a species with a
population trending toward listing but not yet threatened or endangered. 32
Simply stated, intensive care is more expensive than preventive medicine.
Additionally, an agency might invest in species protection programs in
order to build political support that might induce budget increases. A new
program may be an investment in developing a new constituency for
enhanced financial resources.33 Budgeting for species protection might not
be a zero sum game. Increased appropriations for wildlife and fisheries
management in the USFS and wetlands protection in the Army Corps of
Engineers did not come from line item sacrifices in other areas of these
29. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (1991).
30. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
31. See, e.g., Keiter, supra note 5, at 959-61 (describing cooperative actions taken by agencies
participating in the Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee).
32. USDA FOREST SERVICE, TES TASK FORCE REPORT: BRIEFING SUMMARY 11 (April 1990).
33. See infra note 108 and accompanying text on marketing species protection programs.
1992]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
agencies' budgets.
Any implementation tool for improving endangered species protec-
tion ought to be "funding friendly" It should either provide the imple-
menting agency an opportunity to increase or avoid a cut in its budget. The
degree to which this is necessary depends partly on how closely related the
ESA tool is to the agency's perceived mission. The National Park Service
will more likely implement a non-endangered, rare species protection
program than an agency such as the U.S. Department of Energy whose
mission is less congruent with ESA goals.34
D Further Mission
That agencies are motivated to take action to further their missions is
in some ways obvious. However, it can be difficult to predict whether an
agency will regard endangered species protection as a constraint or an
opportunity For instance, land management agencies for many years
viewed the presence of listed species on federal lands as a limitation on the
agencies' missions. An emerging, more constructive attitude views these
species as another resource to husband. Land managers can apply their
professional skills and gain job satisfaction by conserving this resource to
more effectively optimize values produced by the land. Like other,
sometimes competing resources such as game, range, and timber, the
endangered species resource can bring money to the unit or region and
catalyze the formation of a new constituency to support management
decisions.
Likewise, the EPA has long neglected endangered species conserva-
tion because it viewed its mission narrowly, along public health lines.3 5 The
1990 Science Advisory Board report recommending that the EPA "attach
as much importance to reducing ecological risk as it does to reducing
human health risk"3" is beginning to change the Agency's view of its
mission.3 7 Endangered species considerations will be incorporated into the
media branches of the EPA as their mission broadens to include ecological
issues. s Of course, different branches will evolve at different speeds.
34. See infra note 98 and accompanying text for the National Park Service's management policy
on rare species.
35. The agency even neglected its basic, mandatory duties. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v.
Administrator, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the failure to discontinue registration of
strychnine resulted in a section 9 taking of the endangered black-footed ferret).
36. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 6 (1990) (Report of the Science Advisory Board Relative Risk
Reduction Strategies Committee to William K. Reilly, Administrator).
37 See Philip Shabecoff, Report Says E.P.A. Neglects Ecology, N.Y.TMEs, Oct. 2, 1990.
("Mr. Reilly said his agency's budget request for the fiscal year 1992 would reflect the need for a
broader variety of tools in addressing ecological problems.").
38. Recent litigation may prompt the water office to focus more attention on endangered species.
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Agencies are not monolithic. The expansion of an agency's mission to
include endangered species conservation may well depend on the emer-
gence of a strong advocate for conservation. This is certainly true in the
National Forest System of the USFS where the Wildlife and Fisheries staff
has succeeded in raising the profile of endangered species and securing
greater funding.3" Entire agencies may shift the focus of their efforts when
they see their current mission heading toward obsolescence. The Army
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation have experienced some
success in redirecting their missions toward conservation goals.
III. TOOLS To IMPROVE ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION:
APPEALING To AGENCIES' INTERESTS
To improve endangered species conservation, agencies can use tools
for coordination that help avoid lawsuits, enhance discretion, increase
budgets, and further missions. Although not each of the tools discussed
below satisfies all four of these criteria, each describes an under-utilized
opportunity that builds on agency incentives. Not all tools will be
applicable to all agencies. However, this section offers ideas that should be
regarded as starting points for developing species protection programs that
are less crisis driven and more conservation oriented. The most important
trait is shared by all the tools. Each tool requires agencies to work with
partners beyond their geographic and functional jurisdictions.
The order of the tools described reflects a rough progression from
opportunities to participate in procedures detailed in the statute, to those
mentioned or referenced in the statute, to finally, programs that are
implied in the ESA. Endangered species conservation is best accomplished
by preventing extinction emergencies rather than managing them. Some of
the tools deal primarily with species that are candidates for listing but not
yet protected by the Act. Because protection of candidate species will
reduce the need for listing and allow concentration of resources on existing
threatened and endangered species, I include these tools in this article.
Habitat conservation plans, conservation agreements, and sensitive species
programs that target rare species which exhibit trends toward listing do not
just reduce the FWS workload. They also address the broader nature
protection concerns that animate environmental law
An Alabama man recently filed a citizen suit alleging ESA section 7(a)(2) violations in EPA's
approval, without FWS consultation, of Alabama NPDES permits, regulations, and water quality
standards that may affect listed species. Complaint, Muddv. Reilly, CV-91-P-1392-S (N.D. Ala. June
19, 1991). For suggestions on how the EPA can better incorporate ecological concerns into its
programs, see Robert L. Fischman, BiologicalDiversity and Environmental Protection'Authorities to
Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435 (1992).
39. See U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE, THREATENED, ENDANGERED, AND SENSITIVE SPECIES
RECOVERY AND CONSERVATION: ACTION PLAN (April 1990).
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A. Support Listing and Critical Habitat Decisions
Listing is the single most important decision the federal government
makes under the Endangered Species Act. The Act does not offer any
protection until a species is proposed to be placed on the threatened or
endangered list. Even then, protection is procedural only, through the duty
to confer, until the species is listed pursuant to a final rulemaking and
becomes the beneficiary of all the affirmative prohibitive duties.
The Act sets out a number of factors that the FWS must apply to
determine whether to list a species. They include deterioration of the
species' habitat, overuse of the species, disease, predation, and inadequate
existing regulatory mechanisms.4" Other federal agencies, especially land
management agencies, may have relevant information that contributes to
the FWS's understanding of these factors. For instance, land managers
who are out in the field ought to have the best information about habitat,
use, and predation from the evidence they encounter daily 4' A regulatory
agency would best understand regulatory mechanisms and their applica-
bility to a particular species. The EPA, for instance, in regulating pollution
or toxic substances, should work with the FWS on listing issues to
determine which species are and are not protected by EPA standards and
thresholds. With over 1200 biologists on staff, the USFS has a tremendous
reservoir of scientific expertise that it can make available to the FWS. In
1987, when the FWS was still considering the petition to list the northern
spotted owl, the USFS agreed to conduct an accelerated research program
on its old growth forest habitat to help the FWS make its decision.42 The
USFS currently is providing the FWS information that will help determine
whether the Mexican spotted owl merits listing.4 s Because a FWS decision
concerning listing must be based solely on the best scientific and commer-
cial data available,44 adequate information should not be sufficient if other
federal agencies have better knowledge.
The FWS has come under criticism for its lack of progress in shielding
organisms under the protective umbrella of the Act through listing. Species
on the queue for proposed protection under the ESA are known as
candidates. As of December, 1989, there were 601 candidate species for
which substantial information existed to warrant immediate listing.4 5 In
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1988).
41. Morover, the USFS and BLM are required to inventory biological resources on a regular
basis. 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1988); 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (1988).
42. Personal communication with Jay Gore, USFS (May 19, 1992).
43. Id.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1988).
45. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REP No. 90-98, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
AUDIT REPORT: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM 8 (Sept. 1990).
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addition, of the 3033 species suspected of being threatened or endangered
but for which insufficient information exists for listing, the FWS estimated
that around half will eventually qualify for protection.4" Although some
progress might be made through the en masse, multi-species listing
technique recommended by the Interior Department's Inspector General,
the FWS budget remains inadequate for clearing the listing backlog.47
Putting information generated by other federal agencies to work, instead of
developing all of the information itself, would help the FWS move more
quickly to list all species that warrant ESA protection.
Critical habitat is important solely with regard to the section 7 duties
of federal agencies. Federal agencies may not destroy or adversely modify
critical habitat.48 Critical habitat directly links the affirmative federal
duties with the Act's purpose of protecting ecosystems on which species
depend.49 Unlike species listing, critical habitat designation is based on
both scientific and economic considerations. Therefore, federal agencies
with little expertise about the biology of the listed organisms may
nonetheless hold expertise for critical habitat determinations. A land
management agency involved in conducting timber sales or mineral leases
will have economic information relevant to critical habitat designation.
Similarly, a regulatory agency may collect a host of relevant economic data
on which it bases standards and thresholds.
As a result of the litigation over the northern spotted owl, the FWS
will be under more pressure to designate critical habitat. Since 1978, the
FWS has been required to designate critical habitat unless it is not prudent.
Designation is not prudent only in the limited situation where identification
of habitat will increase the threat of taking or otherwise not be beneficial to
the species.50 However, since 1982, the FWS has been able to delay
designation for up to a year by finding that critical habitat is not
determinable. 1 In Northern Spotted Owl v Lujan,52 the same district
court that found the FWS decision not to list the owl in 1987 to be arbitrary
and capricious53 ordered the FWS to designate critical habitat. The FWS
had followed its common practice of merely stating in its proposed and final
listing notice that critical habitat was not determinable. The court held
that the agency is not entitled to an automatic extension merely by
invoking indeterminacy The FWS can get an extension on designation
46. Id.
47. Id. at 7.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988).
50. 50 C.F.R § 424.12(a)(1) (1991).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) (1988).
52. 753 F Supp. 621 (D. Or. 1991).
53. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F Supp. 479 (D. Or. 1988).
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only by explaining why it cannot fulfill the Act's preference for designating
critical habitat concurrently with listing. The court suggested that an
adequate explanation would show why critical habitat is not determinable,
what effort was made to determine the habitat, and what additional
information is needed. Given its scarce resources, the FWS will have to rely
more on the support that other agencies can provide.
But, what incentives will other agencies have to aid the FWS in its
mission' Since the enforceable duties pertain only to listed species and
critical habitat, an agency that assists in listing and designation may be
setting itself up for a future citizen suit. On the other hand, agency
information will not always support listing. Better information sometimes
indicates that a threat is not as serious as once believed or critical habitat
should be smaller For example, the USFS has sponsored a number of
projects to study old growth forest habitat in the Nicolet National Forest.
A USFS/Audubon Society cooperative monitoring effort found that many
bird species thought to be dependent on old growth forest habitat, such as
the ovenbird and the hermit thrush,54 are more common than initially
believed. 55
Moreover, the presence of a listed species on a public land unit may be
a source of more budget dollars. Congress does not track money spent on
general conservation measures as closely as it does expenditures for
threatened and endangered species. 56 Because ESA recovery has a
relatively high priority in the non-game federal wildlife budget, a listed
species can be a beacon to attract additional resources from Congress or the
FWS.57 For instance, since the FWS proposed listing the northern spotted
owl in 1989, the USFS's budget for managing spotted owls more than
tripled, from $2 million in fiscal year 1989 to over $6 million in fiscal year
1992.58 For the past two fiscal years, Congress has earmarked over $3
million explicitly for USFS spotted owl surveys. 59
54. Seiurus aurocapillus and Catharus guttatus.
55. Robert W. Howe et al., MONITORING BIRDS IN A REGIONAL LANDSCAPE: LESSONS FROM THE
NICOLET NATIONAL FOREST BIRD SURVEY, in Proceedings of the Workshop on Avian Monitoring
Techniques (Nov. 6-7, 1991) (U.S. Forest ServIce/U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Patuxent,
Maryland).
56. 16U.S.C.§ 1544(1988).See, e.g.,U.S. FISHANDWILDLIFESERVICE, FEDERAL AND STATE
ENDANGERED SPECIES EXPENDITURES: FISCAL YEAR (1991).
57. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of FWS contributions to
recovery planning. A unit manager, such as a district ranger, can use the presence of a listed species to
attract intra-agency dollars that are available only for recovery purposes. In the Forest Service, the
threatened, endangered, and sensitive species budget is one of the few growth areas in an agency whose
overall appropriation from Congress has been declining.
58. Personal communication with Jay Gore, USFS (May 19, 1992).
59. Id. Congress also earmarked funds for the USFS to provide information that would assist the
FWS in making its listing decision for the Mexican spotted owl. Id.
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Finally, resource management agencies should not be ashamed if
many listed species occur on their lands. Frequently, this is not so much a
reflection of poor management or planning on the agency's part. Instead, it
results from development on and conversion of surrounding habitat that
limits occurrence of the species to the land that retains its biological
integrity 60
B. Participate in Recovery Planning
Although recent litigation has focused on listing species, preventing
jeopardy, and stopping takings, the goal of the ESA is recovery The FWS
must prepare a recovery plan for each listed species unless the effort will be
counterproductive. 61 Recovery plans describe recovery goals, site-specific
management tasks, criteria for monitoring the success of the plan,
responsible parties, and estimates of the time and costs of recovery
measures.62 The Act does not set a timetable for development of recovery
plans, but the 1988 amendments require the FWS to report to Congress on
its recovery efforts every two years.6" As of July 1, 1991, the FWS had
approved recovery plans for 59 % of all listed species that occur in the
United States. Of course, the challenge of developing and approving
recovery plans pales in comparison to the cost of implementing those
plans. 4
Federal agencies and states6 5 have long cooperated with the FWS in
recovery planning. Of all the opportunities for coordination described in
this article, federal agencies have the greatest experience with recovery
plans. Recovery plans are developed and implemented by interdisciplinary
teams that often include representatives from federal agencies, states,
Indian tribes, universities, conservation organizations, and other inter-
60. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F Supp. 1260, 1265 (E.D. Tex. 1988), arffd in part,
vacated in part, Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (observing that red-cockaded
woodpeckers are dependent on USFS habitat because suitable trees on private land have been
destroyed).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(1) (1988).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(1) (1988). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE, POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATING RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED
AND THREATENED SPECIES 2-4 (May 1990).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(3) (1988). Since 1988, the FWS has been required to report annually to
Congress all reasonably identifiable conservation expenditures on a species by species basis. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1544 (1988).
64. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note
4.
65. Although this article is limited to federal agencies, states cooperate extensively with the
FWS on recovery plans. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MANAGE-
MENT IMPROVEMENTS COULD ENHANCE RECOVERY PROGRAM 38-86 (GAO/RCED-89-5, Dec. 1988)
(case studies listing the roles played by state agencies in recovery plan implementation). The ESA
offers recovery money to states that enter into agreements with the FWS. 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1988).
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ested parties.66 The recovery team structure is flexible, allowing for
working groups, observers, or consultants.6 7 Although the FWS Regional
Director is responsible for the activities of the recovery team, non-FWS
participants can contribute a majority of the resources for recovery For
example, as of 1987, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) footed 60 %
of the bill for recovery of the threatened New Mexico ridgenose rattle-
snake.68 Similarly, the recovery effort for the endangered Gila topminnow
was split 34 % Forest Service, 32 % state, 26 % FWS, and 7 % BLM.6 9 The
FWS, though, usually contributes a substantial share, if not the majority,
of recovery funding. This can be an important source of resource manage-
ment money for a federal public land agency
Whether a recovery plan, once approved by the FWS, binds the FWS
or other federal agencies to engage in the management measures described
is an open legal question. Although the Act uses the mandatory "shall" in
requiring development and implementation of the plans, the language is
directed to the FWS, not other federal agencies.70 The only published
judicial opinion interpreting this provision found that the National Park
Service (NPS) could stay the implementation of a recovery plan for the
grizzly bear pending the results of new environmental analyses relating to
the impacts of the Fishing Bridge Campground.7' The court would "not
attempt to second guess the Secretary's motives for not following the
recovery plan."7 Currently, agencies do not prepare environmental
assessments or impact statements for recovery plans. Instead, agencies
fulfill NEPA requirements as management measures are implemented. If
recovery plans are binding on agencies, then the plans will have to go
through the NEPA process much like USFS land and resource manage-
ment plans or NPS general management plans.
Regardless of whether recovery plans are binding, federal agencies
ought to recognize that their interests lie in participating in plan develop-
ment. If the plans are binding, then the agencies need to ensure that their
66. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, POLICY AND GUIDE-
LINES FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATING RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES
II-2 (May 1990).
67 Id.
68. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MANAGEMENT IMPROVE-
MENTS COULD ENHANCE RECOVERY PROGRAM 72 (GAO/RCED-89-5, Dec. 1988). The FWS
contributed 30% of recovery funds. Id.
69. Id. at 80.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1988).
71. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Park Serv., 669 F Supp. 384, 388-89 (D. Wyo. 1987).
72. Id. at 389. But see Harry R. Bader, Wolf Conservation: The Importance of Following
Endangered Species Recovery Plans, 13 HARV ENVTL. L. REV 517, 529-30 (arguing that an action
specifically mandated in the implementation schedule of a recovery plan, in contrast to the NPS
decision to leave Fishing Bridge open, is enforceable by the courts).
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discretion is explicitly preserved in the plan or that it is exercised in
designing the management measures for the plan. If the plans are not
binding, agencies should still find participation on recovery teams worth-
while to shape conservation activities that will occur on their geographic or
functional turf. The broad section 7(a)(1) conservation duty allows the
federal agencies to take actions that reach beyond their normal mandate.73
Agencies that manage habitat for listed species may find the FWS
reaching into their bailiwicks if they do not participate in recovery
planning to protect their prerogatives. Finally, joining in a recovery effort
might offer some protection against citizen suits. 74 Activities that might
otherwise be construed as requiring formal consultation or effecting a
taking will likely be viewed as more benign by a court if the agency is
following a FWS-approved recovery plan.
C. Instigate Habitat Conservation Plans
The 1982 amendments to the ESA carved out an exception to the
taking prohibition as applied to privately owned habitat. A person wishing
to develop property may apply for an incidental take permit to excuse
potential section 9 liability To secure a permit, an applicant must prepare
a habitat conservation plan (HCP) that specifies: the impacts of the taking;
the measures to monitor, minimize, and mitigate such impacts; the funding
available to implement those measures; and the alternatives to the action
considered and the reasons why they were not selected.7 The FWS may
issue an incidental take permit if it finds that the taking will be incidental to
the purpose of the project; the applicant will, to the maximum extent
practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such taking; adequate
funding will be provided; and the taking will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the recovery of the species.76 The FWS may require additional
measures in HCPs or as permit conditions. 7 Thus far, six HCPs have been
approved by FWS permits.78
Although HCPs are associated with private projects, not federal
agency actions, they are significant because they represent an opportunity
for ecosystem-wide planning to conserve species. Federal agencies should
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1988). See discussion of the conservation duty supra notes 12-14
and accompanying text.
74. Keiter, supra note 5 at 960-61 (suggesting that agency participation in the Interagency
Grizzly Bear Committee, charged with recovery planning, has shielded resource management
decisions from judicial interference).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(i)(C) (1991).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (1988).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(A)(2) (1988).
78. MICHAEL BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING EXPERIENCE 41 (World Wildlife Fund ed., 1991).
1992]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
take advantage of this opportunity wherever species either depend on
habitat that is not entirely federally controlled or are threatened by
activities (such as real estate development) that are not federally regu-
lated. Robert Thornton has observed that section 7 consultations can
"jump start" an "HCP by quickly establishing a foundation for the
regional conservation program."79 The "jump start" can occur when an
activity to be covered in an HCP requires federal approval. A dredge or fill
permit, a right-of-way, or an federal oil lease may spur federal negotiations
over mitigation measures that will form the nucleus for HCP negotiation."
Also, because federal lands often contain the most intact areas of
habitat, federal agency involvement can provide a core protected area
around which an HCP can prescribe restricted development."' In this way,
the ESA provisions can be used to achieve the sort of ecosystem protection
envisioned by the biosphere reserve program and world conservation
strategy to protect overall biological diversity 82 A regional plan would also
highlight the core public land area as having been well managed to keep
habitat or species intact. This establishes political capital that might prove
useful to the managing agency in the future. HCPs usually contain fee
collection provisions so that the developers that cause incidental takes pay
for their mitigation. The fees are a source of funding that federal agencies
involved in the HCP might be able to tap into for conservation purposes.
Federal agencies may also want to get directly involved with HCPs to
devise more comprehensive, proactive conservation plans than result from
formal consultation. Although section 7 is limited to proposed and listed
species, the HCP is designed to address land use conflicts over a region for
both listed and unlisted species.83 Furthermore, because cumulative
79. Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation
Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605, 649-50 (1991) (describing
consultations that furthered habitat conservation planning activities).
80. HCP approval through the issuance of an incidental take permit itself requires section 7
consultation. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (1988). See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835,97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 29-30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2870-71; 50 Fed. Reg. 59, 683 (1985), (cited in
DANIEL ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION 84, n. 113 (Stanford Environmental Law Society ed., 1989)).
81. See Thornton, supra note 79, at 649-50, 653 (giving examples of this federal contribution to
HCPs in Riverside County, California; Kern County, California; and Austin, Texas).
82. UNESCO, BACKGROUNDER: THE MAB PROGRAMME 10 (undated) (describing the
biosphere reserve program); Kenton Miller, Biosphere Reserves in Concept and Practice, in TOWARDS
THE BIOSPHERE RESERVE: EXPLORING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARKS AND ADJACENT LANDS 7
(Robert Scace & Clifford Martinka eds., 1982); INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF
NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY (1980).
83. Rohlf states:
Lawmakers cited two reasons why conservation plans should also cover unlisted species.
First, if a plan considers unlisted as well as listed species, subsequent listings of species in the
area would require few or no changes to the plan, enabling the activity in question to
continue without interruption. In addition, plans not limited to listed species would more
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impacts of future federal actions on protected species are not considered in
section 7 consultation,84 an HCP may better help agencies and interested
parties to identify the extent to which development activities can occur. If
parties rely solely on section 7, there is no indication from the FWS just
how far future activities can go. No one can be certain when the next
incremental federal action will result in jeopardy " If the parties develop
an HCP approved by the FWS, they will have an estimate of the extent to
which they can carry their actions without jeopardy For federal actions
that involve permitting or licensing a private activity, HCPs offer a
comprehensive, negotiated alternative to case-by-case approval or denial.
In this way the HCP might be used as a tool to dissipate political heat from
a controversial development.86
D Manage with Conservation Agreements
The FWS often protects important habitat for listed species on private
land through voluntary agreements with landowners.87 However, volun-
tary agreements in the form of memoranda of understanding may also be
used to protect habitat managed by federal agencies. These memoranda of
closely conform to the broad conservation policies Congress sought to further by enacting
the ESA.
Rohlf, supra note 80 at 82-83 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2871).
84. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1991) defines the "cumulative effects" considered in a biological
opinion to include future state or private activities but excludes future federal activities. Cf. 40 C.F.R. §
1508.7 (1990) (defining "cumulative impact" for NEPA analysis to include future actions regardless
of what agency or person undertakes it). For a comparison of the two different ways of considering
cumulative issues, see U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Memorandum from
Associate Solicitor, Conservation and Wildlife, to the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service (Aug.
27, 1981).
Cumulative effects must be distinguished from indirect effects "caused by the proposed action and
are later in time, but still reasonably certain to occur." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1991). See Bob Marshall
Alliancev. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. dentedsub nom; Kohlman v. Alliance, 109 S.Ct.
1340 (1989) (holding that the FWS must analyze post-leasing activities when preparing a biological
opinion on an oil/gas lease); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Forest
Service must evaluate impacts of both the road planned and future timber sales that will be facilitated
by the road).
85. A recovery plan, however, can aid in planning. For instance, the Interagency Grizzly Bear
Committee developed a cumulative effects model to evaluate project impacts. Keiter, supra note 5 at
959; Gallatin National Forest, U.S. Forest Service, Cumulative Effects Analysis Process for the
Yellowstone Ecosystem, in Ski Yellowstone Biological Assessment, App. I (June 1987).
86. Sometimes developers prefer the faster section 7 mechanism. Bean, et aL, supra note 78, at
47-48. For example, Waste Management, Inc. dealt with endangered species impacts of its Kirby
Canyon landfill by persuading the Federal Highway Administration to initiate consultatiop for a
highway interchange providing access to the landfill. Id. at 48. See also Thorton, supra note 79, at 619
(describing this Federal Highway Administration consultation).
87. Examples include agreements to protect nest sites for bald eagles, areas around release sites
for peregrine falcons, and breeding/hibernation caves for Indiana bats.
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understanding are commonly known as conservation agreements and are
particularly valuable for guiding management of candidate species not
otherwise subject to informal consultation.88
For instance, a 1983 conservation agreement between the BLM and
the FWS established a program to protect the candidate desert playa plant
species, Davis peppergrass,8 9 found only in southwestern Idaho and
southeastern Oregon. Davis peppergrass is vulnerable to destruction
through disturbance from off-road vehicle use, cattle trampling, and
earthen dam-building. 90 In the conservation agreement, the BLM commit-
ted to outline management measures to reduce threats to the species, and to
monitor the plant's occurrences. Davis peppergrass is in the candidate
species category for organisms that may possibly be appropriate for listing
but for which inadequate information exists (category two). Therefore, the
BLM's ongoing monitoring provides up-to-date information that is partic-
ularly important to the FWS.
In a notice explaining its decision not to list the Jemez Mountains
salamander, 91 the FWS stated that a conservation agreement it signed
with the USFS and a New Mexico state agency removed the threat to the
salamander habitat.92 In the agreement, the USFS promised to survey
timber stands for the salamander and prohibit logging where salamanders
are found. In three years, the Santa Fe National Forest promised to
incorporate into its master forest plan a salamander management plan
designed to ensure the long-term viability of all populations of the species.
Here, the USFS eliminated the need for listing and preserved some
management flexibility
A land manager loses discretion when an occurring candidate species
is listed under the ESA. Subsequent to listing, the manager no longer can
make significant decisions without involving the FWS. Even more impor-
tant, activities formerly permitted or planned may be blocked by substan-
tive protections for the species. Therefore, it is sensible that a land manager
would plan to manage species that indicate downward population trends to
prevent listing. A conservation agreement guards against performing
discretionary actions that would lead to listing and subsequent loss of
control.
88. Regional foresters are encouraged to enter into conservation agreements with the FWS to
"take the initiative in removing any threats to [candidate species] so that they no longer qualify for
formal listing." U.S. Forest Service Manual § 2672.12 (Oct. 1986).
89. Lepidium davisii.
90. Memorandum of Understanding, Lepidium davisii (BLM/FWS 1983); DeBolt &
Doremus, 1988 Inventory and Status Report for Lepidium davtsii (BLM Boise District, March 1989).
91. Plethodon neomexicanus.
92. 57 Fed. Reg. 11,459 to 11,460 (1992).
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E. Implement Sensitive Species Programs
Agencies, on their own, may devise programs to protect species that
are not on the threatened or endangered list. Most agencies have guidelines
or policies in addition to more formal regulations that channel their
discretion. Any of these methods may be used to establish a list of species of
special concern and a procedure for giving their conservation needs
consideration.
The model for this type of initiative is the USFS sensitive species
program. One reason why the USFS has the best and most formal model is
that its regulations require it to manage habitat to "maintain viable
populations of existing native and desired non-native" vertebrates.93 This
regulation partially implements Congress' mandate that the USFS "pro-
vide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the suitability
and capability" of its land.94 The requirement to maintain viable popula-
tions goes beyond what is minimally necessary to comply with the ESA.9 5
Other land management and regulatory agencies have incentives
similar to the USFS's program to implement a sensitive species program.
Some agencies even have similar statutory mandates. For instance, the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act seeks to "restore and maintain the
biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 96 It commands the EPA to
develop water quality criteria that reflect "the effects of pollutants on
biological community diversity "'I The National Park Service Manage-
ment Policy commits the agency to "identify all state and locally listed
threatened, endangered, rare, declining, sensitive, or candidate species
that are native to and present in the parks, and their critical habitats."9' 8
Similarly, BLM policy prescribes ecosystem management "to ensure self
sustaining populations and a natural abundance and diversity of wild-
life."99 Two specific goals of BLM policy are to manage habitat to maintain
populations at a level that will avoid the need to list species and to conserve
rare, vulnerable, and representative habitats, plant communities, and
93. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1991).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1988). See 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.26 and 219.27(g) for other
regulations implementing the National Forest Management Act's diversity mandate.
95. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 199 1) (holding that listing under the
ESA does not reduce the planning obligations of the Forest Service under the National Forest
Management Act and upholding an injunction on timber sales until the Forest Service implements
adequate standards and guidelines to maintain the viability of the northern spotted owl).
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I) (1988). See Fischman, supra note 38, at 443-58, 491-99, for a
discussion 'of EPA programs to implement this mandate.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (1988).
98. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, MANAGEMENT POLICY,
ch. 4, 11 (1988).
99. Bureau of Land Management Manual § 6500.06.
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ecosystems.'
Even though the USFS has the most elaborate program to protect
non-listed species, it is set forth only in the USFS Manual. Connoisseurs of
administrative law will recognize the multi-volume Manual as an odd,
hybrid document containing procedures for staff that is part rule and part
informal guidance. The Manual section relevant to sensitive species
management has not gone through notice and comment rulemaking.
Current revisions to this Manual section are nearing a close. As of
November 1992, the USFS has not yet decided whether to propose the new
Manual section through a rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure
Act.101 The USFS would be well served to publish the new section as a
proposed rule in the Federal Register and invite public comment. Besides
building a stronger public constituency to support the program, it would
give sensitive species procedures, such as biological evaluations, higher
standing in the USFS decision-making process. It would also add stability
to the program as subsequent alterations would need to be promulgated in a
similar fashion. Courts will enforce manual provisions regardless of
whether they are promulgated through informal rulemaking if there is a
sufficient nexus between the provisions and a particular statutory mandate
"to conclude that the grant of authority contemplates the regulations
issued."'0 2 In any event, a sensitive species program manual revision will
likely generate the requisite public interest or controversy to trigger a
notice and comment requirement pursuant to existing USFS
regulations. 0 3
The goal of the USFS sensitive species program is to meet the agency's
viability mandate, better fulfill the purposes of the National Environmen-
100. U.S. DEPT. OFTHE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, FISH AND WILDLIFE 2000:
A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 20-21 (undated).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
102. Lumber, Production and Industrial Workers Log Scalers Local 2058 v. United States, 580
F. Supp. 279 (D. Or. 1984) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,308-09 (1979) and stating
that a Manual provision dealing with independent third-party scaling organizations is not binding on
the agency). Accord Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Devlin, 776 F. Supp. 1440, 1447-48 (D. Or.
1991). Cf. Squaw Transit Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 492, 496 (10th Cir. 1978) (requiring an
"agency to adhere to its own pronouncements, or explain its departure from them"), cited in Citizens
for Environmental Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970,986 (D. Colo. 1989) (remanding a forest
plan for failing to comply with a previous USDA administrative appeal decision); Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (requiring the Bureau of Indian Affairs to follow the guidelines set out in its
Manual for determining which directives to publish in the Federal Register); Service v. Dulles, 354
U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (requiring the Secretary of State to follow guidelines set out in the department's
Manual of Regulations and Procedures).
103. 36 C.F.R. 216.6 (1991). At minimum, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that the
agency publish its manual provisions in the Federal Register "for the guidance of the public." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1988).
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tal Policy Act (NEPA),1°4 assist states in achieving their goals for
conservation of endemic species, and establish objectives for federal
candidate species.10 5 A sensitive species is a plant or animal for which
population viability is a concern due to significant actual or predicted
downward trends in population, density, or habitat capability 106 Sensitive
species often are candidates for federal listing or are identified by a state as
deserving local protection. Like the ESA itself, the sensitive species
program protects only those taxa that are included on a particular list.
Sensitive species lists are collected by all but one of the nine USFS regions.
Lists contain from 857 entries to eight.10 7
The USFS implements sensitive species conservation through the
preparation of biological evaluations which examine how proposed actions
may affect sensitive species. Unlike biological assessments, which are used
to determine whether an action may adversely affect a species, the
biological evaluation determines whether the action is likely to result in a
trend toward federal listing. Rather than impose additional substantive
restrictions on the USFS, the sensitive species program helps the agency
make more informed decisions about whether it is complying with its
viability requirement.
As with the conservation agreement, a sensitive species program
allows voluntary, minor modifications of standard management proce-
dures to forestall listing and the more severe restrictions listing imposes on
discretion. Another reason that resource managers in particular might be
attracted to a sensitive species program is that it allows more creative
conservation activities than a threatened 6r endangered species program.
Because the stakes for any management action are higher for a listed
species on the brink of extinction, biologists must be extremely risk averse
with respect to recovery programs or mitigation tools. Sensitive species, on
the other hand, are more resilient. Therefore, managers can experiment
with tools to mitigate impacts of projects or engage in ecological trials that
involve greater risks. Moreover, evaluations of the impacts of various
activities on sensitive species highlights priority areas for conservation
efforts and research.
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1998).
105. Forest Service Manual § 2670.32 (Oct. 1986).
106. Forest Service Manual § 2670.5(19) (Oct. 1986).
107. Topik, Number of Sensitive Species Designated by each Region, USDA Forest Service
(presented at Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species Management: Traversing the Legal and
Administrative Terrain, USFS Wildlife and Fisheries Continuing Education Course) (May 6-10,
1991). The variation in the numbers of sensitive species listed may reflect not just bioregional
variations; it may also reflect varying degrees of regional commitment to the concept. The Rocky
Mountain Region, for instance, has no sensitive species list because the region is not convinced of the
benefits of the program. Gary Cargill, Address on New Perspectives on National Forest Management,
University of Wyoming, Laramie (Jan. 21, 1992).
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Finally, for an agency with a reputation for environmental destruc-
tion, a sensitive species program may be good politics. It can demonstrate
that the agency, despite development errors in the past, is concerned about
promoting sound stewardship. Agencies need constituent support to
maintain their budgets and implement their plans. A sensitive species
program is an effective way to market the agency to a strong constitu-
ency 108 It can return the luster to an agency's tarnished mission.
IV CONCLUSION
Full-fledged implementation of the ESA, where agencies do more
than just go through the motions to avoid citizen suits, is difficult precisely
because species management makes demands that restrict discretion,
drain budgets, and interfere with agency missions. These characteristics
ensure that the citizen suit will remain by far the most important tool for
nature recovery However, the prospect of avoiding suits can be used in
conjunction with other motivators to build a more comprehensive, proac-
tive conservation program.
The subtitle to this article poses a question: What should we expect of
federal agencies ) The preceding pages lay out a smorgasbord of specific
answers. But all of these recommendations emerge from a single, simple
insight. We should expect agencies to pursue activities that they can
reconcile with their interests. We should not expect heroics but we should
not tolerate timidity in promoting the goals of the Endangered Species Act.
Almost all the tools I discuss in this article have been tested with some
success by federal officials searching for creative approaches. These
experiments show that agencies can do much more than answer the
challenge of species protection with shoulder-shrugging and finger-
pointing.
In proposing to make better use of the administrative tools that reach
beyond the basic duties of the ESA, the aim is not simply to increase the
effectiveness of endangered species protection. The aim is also to integrate
species preservation with other environmental concerns. Once the tools
establish constructive channels of interagency coordination for endan-
108. Over the past several years the USFS has become increasingly aware of the need to market
its programs and now couches much of its public materials in consumerist terms. See Robertson,
Outdoor Recreation and Resource Protection: Administrative Perspective, in A MILLION SQUARE
MILES: A PUBLIC LANDS AGENDA FOR THE 1990's (Apr. i 2, 1989, Washington, D.C.); Hal Salwasser,
et al., A Marketing Approach to Wildlife and Fisheries Program Management, in TRANSACTIONS OF
THE NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE 261-270 (1989). See, e.g.,
U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE, SHARING THE COMMITMENT: PARTNERSHIPS FOR WILDLIFE, FISH, AND
RARE PLANTS ON THE NATIONAL FORESTS 16 (1991) (making reference to the "customer-oriented"
programs of Get Wild, Rise to the Future, and Every Species Counts).
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gered species conservation, we can enlist them for broader environmental
quality challenges.

